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The 1962 Dillon Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
committed the European Community (EC) to duty-free bindings (no restrictions) on oilseed 
imports. This concession was given by the EC in exchange for allowing trade barriers in the 
newly formed Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to protect high domestic price supports 
on grains from foreign imports. CAP border measures isolated the high supports from world 
markets. 
In 1962 the European Community was a net importer of major farm commodities. 
Grain exporting countries did not foresee that the high grain price supports and increased 
productivity would eventually give the EC a major grain surplus which would, in the absence 
of production controls, receive massive export subsidies. Duty-free access of oilseeds and 
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corn-gluten feeds reduced opportunities to feed excess EC grains to livestock. Given the 
chance in the 1990s to renegotiate the Dillon Round, in all likelihood the Europeans would 
not agree to exclude oilseeds from their Common Agricultural Poliq nor would the United 
States agree. to no limitations on export subsidies· to dispose of EC grain surpluses . 
. 
Rapid expansion of the EC livestock sector has made oilseed components of feeds 
very important. The EC is the world leader in oilseed consumption and oilseed imports. 
The Community would like to extract the internal farm income and price stability benefits 
of variable levies and reduce internal competition from cheap protein feeds in this huge 
market but has been unsuccessful thus far. 
Farm income benefits, stability and levy receipts are not the only reasons for desiring 
change. The left panel in Figure 1 illustrates the high supports and isolation achieved by 
EC border measures in most commodities,. including grains. High domestic market price 
support (P8) in excess of world market price P w has decreased consumption (qd to q~) and 
increased production (~ to q;). EC agricultural officials perceive that extensive market 
support in grains and other crops has caused distortions in the grain sector and in the 
unprotected oilseed sector. Increased production in grains has shifted production away from 
substitutes such as oilseeds, reducing supply s to s' (right panel of Figure 1). High prices 
for grain components of feed mixes has also shifted demand toward non-grain ingredients 
such as oilseeds, raising oilseed demand d to d ': These distortions have increased oilseed 
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Additionally, export subsidies on grains, area a+ b + c in the left panel, have become 
very demanding on the CAP budget. Prohibition of oilseed import restrictions preclude 
tariff receipts to help balance the CAP budget. 
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Figure 1. Oilseed Distortions from EC Market Price Support to Grains. 
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The European Community would like to retain grain support and export subsidy 
opportunities while pulling oilseeds inside the CAP barriers, but other countries in the 
GATI have rejected this option. The EC solution up to 1989 had been an oilseed import 
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substitution policy in the form of a processor subsidy which allowed a premium to be passed 
on to Community producers. This premium was expanded many times in the 1980s and 
resulted in a doubling of oilseed production in the Community between 1982 and 1987. 
The producer subsidy is illustrated in Figure 2. The EC subsidized price P s in the 
left panel shifts the domestic supply to ss ~. EC demand shifted from ED to ED~· in the 
center panel and world price fell from P w to P ~ which hurts ROW producers such as U.S. 
farmers (loss area 1 + 2 + 3 + 4, right panel). EC oilseed consumers, still able to purchase at 
the world price p~, benefitted by area c+d+e and producers by area a compared to a free 
market equilibrium at P w· European taxpayers must expend area a+ b + c + d to support the 
policy. Instead of generating levies like other EC imports, the oilseed policy further strains 
the CAP budget. Even with this producer subsidy, the distortions from not having oilseeds 
inside CAP barriers are not fully removed. Feed processors purchasing oilseeds at world 
prices continue to find them a bargain compared to highly protected grains. 
In December 1987 the American Soybean Association (ASA) filed a section 301 
Unfair Trade Petition against the European Community. The petition alleged that the EC 
oilseed subsidies constituted a thinly disguised import barrier. The Dispute Settlement 
Panel of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) ruled in December, 1989 
that the European oilseed subsidies violate GATT trading rules and discriminate against 
oilseed imports. In view of this most recent development, the producer subsidy will be 
eliminated unless multilateral negotiations approve the subsidy as part of a broader 
agreement that could reduce EC grain export subsidies. 
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Figure 2. EC Oilseed Producer Subsidy. 
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European Community policy makers describe a move toward equal levels of market 
support across all related commodities as "rebalancing." Community leaders would prefer 
to rebalance oilseeds at high levels without disturbing grain supports. Such a plan is 
impossible given the opposition of exporters including the United States. In recent meetings 
of the Uruguay Round of GATT, EC negotiators have been pressing a rebalancing proposal 
to bring oilseeds behind CAP barriers while concurrently lowering all commodity supports 
to a uniform level. 
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To be acceptable to the U.S., a uniform level of support to rebalance EC 
commodities must leave U.S. producers at least no worse off. One issue is whether such a 
rebalancing solution exists. Given present oilseed subsidies, it is unlikely that recalancing 
at reduced support levels could leave EC producers indifferent without direct income 
compensation. The objective of this paper is to estimate the impact on the European 
Community and the U.S. of an EC rebalancing scheme that might be acceptable to 
negotiators. 
Conceptual Framework 
Conceptual models in Figures 3 and 4 depict the effects of incorporating oilseeds in 
the CAP system of variable levies and of lowering market supports for grains. In Figure 3 
the processor subsidy (assumed to be passed to producers at price P5 ) is extended to uniform 
market protection for grains and oilseeds. The EC domestic support price P5 determines 
consumption as well as production. Demand shifts from free market level dd to dd ~. 
Supply shifts from ss to ss'and imports fall from qd-q~ to q~-q~. Reduced imports lower 
world price to P ;. European producers are not affected but consumers lose area a+ b + c +d. 
The position of European taxpayers changes from paying the area a+ b in Figure 2 to 
collecting levies c+e in Figure 3. The lower world price benefits U.S. oilseed consumers 
by area 1 + 2 but producers lose area 1 + 2 + 3 in the right panel. 
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Figure 3. EC Change from Oilseed Producer Support to Full Market Protection. 
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Figure 4 depicts a lower level of intervention in the EC grain market. European 
consumers benefit by area a+ b while producers are worse off by area a+ b +c. Taxpayers 
benefit by area b + c + d + e + f + g + h + i + j + k. The increased receipts evident in Figure 3 and 
the savings in export restitution from Figure 4 potentially could enable the EC to directly 
compensate producer losses with a decoupled payment without further budget expenditure. 
World grain price raised from P w with the current policy top;_ from lower EC grain exports 
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in Figure 4 benefits U.S. producers by area 1 + 2 + 3. U.S. consumers are worse off by are 
1+2. 
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Figure 4. Impacts of EC Grain Export Subsidy Reduction. 
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The conceptual framework does not reveal whether a uniform level of EC support 
to oilseeds and grains will balance losses to U.S. oilseed producers (Figure 3) with gains to 
U.S. grain producers (Figure 4). The simplified partial equilibrium conceptual model does 
not account for individual country impacts or interactions among commodities. These are 
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best analyzed with a mathematical international trade model. Impacts of rebalancing are 
quantified for the EC and the U.S. in the next section. 
Empirical Analysis 
Impacts of including oilseeds in a rebalanced Common Agricultural Policy were 
quantified using a nine-region world trade model incorporating the assumptions of 
neoclassical trade theory (see Roningen, et al.; Sullivan, et al.; Gleckler and Tweeten for 
description of model). Data for 1989 were used to initialize the model. Results reflect 
changes from 1989 conditions and are in 1989 prices. The behavioral coefficients apply to 
an intermediate-run period of 4 to 5 years, other things equal. The model simultaneously 
estimates changes in markets for nine commodities: beef, pork, poultry meat, wheat, corn, 
other coarse grains, oilseeds (principally soybeans, rapeseed, and sunflower seed), oilmeal 
and sugar. Substitutability and complementarity among commodities are accounted for in 
behavioral equations. 
Uniformity of support with EC rebalancing was represented in the empirical analysis 
as a percentage of market prices. Table 1 shows 1989 grain and oilseed prices in the EC 
were from 128 percent to 166 percent of the world market price. Rebalancing was 
simulated by giving oilseeds and oilmeal uniform market protection by realigning oilseed 
and grain..supports. Different levels of uniform support were simulated (110 percent, 120 
percent, etc.) in an attempt to discover a rebalancing where gains to U.S. grain producers 
offset losses to U.S. oilseed producers, leaving aggregate producer surplus nearly unchanged. 
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Table 1. 1989 Actual EC Price Support as a Percent of World Market Price. 
Commodity 
Wheat 
Corn 
Coarse Grains 
Oilseeds 
Weighted Average 
Percent of World 
Market Price 
144 
166 
128 
147 
142 
The uniform EC support which most nearly balances U.S. producer losses and gains 
was 120 percent of 1989 world prices. (The net U.S. producer surplus gain for nine 
commodities was only $19 million.) At levels of uniform EC support above 120 percent, 
U.S. oilseed producer losses exceeded grain producer gains. At levels of EC support below 
120 percent the reverse was true. The 140 percent uniform level (the weighted average 
from Table 1) simulates the case where oilseeds are brought behind CAP barriers and 
support to EC grains is little changed. Uniform EC support at 140 percent of unsupported 
world market prices indicates EC producer surplus change to be m:nimal ($13 million in 
Table 2). 
The data in Table 2 indicate that there is indeed a solution to EC rebalancing which 
causes minimal net impacts on US producer incomes. This uniform level of support is 
approximately one-half the current average increment over 1989 EC border prices for grains 
and oilseeds. In the case of wheat it represents a drop in support from approximately $6.70 
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per bushel to $5.59 per bushel. The reduction from 140 percent to 120 percent may seem 
dramatic, but may be the minimal reduction the U.S. could agree to without intense 
opposition from Americar~ farmers if oilseeds were brought fully into the CAP. For that 
reason this solution is worthy of further attention. 
Table 2. Producer Surplus Change at Different Levels of EC Rebalancing. 
Uniform Support of Producer Surplus Change 
Grains and Oilseeds for All Commodities 
us EC ROW 
(Percent of world ($million) 
trade price) 
140 -565 13 -1987 
130 -338 -1884 -410 
120 19 -4360 1777 
110 238 -4891 2818 
Table 3 lists changes in world prices when EC grains and oilseeds are rebalanced at 
the 120 percent level. As expected, the greatest impacts come in the grain and oilseed 
markets. World prices in other markets do not change appreciably. 
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Table 3. Changes in WorJd Price5 when 
EC Rebalances at 120 Percent Level. 
Percent 
Commodity Change 
Beef -0.20 
Pork -1.50 
Poultry Meat -0.88 
Wheat 8.80 
Corn 4.73 
Coarse Grains -1.44 
Oilseeds -3.14 
Oilmeal -4.04 
Sugar -0.58 
Shocks to world markets originate in the European Community whose response to 
rebalancing at the 120 percent level is presented in Table 4. Livestock production expands 
due to less expensive grain feed components. EC wheat and corn market prices fall 
considerably with rebalancing at 120 percent. This induces significant decreases in EC 
production, increases in consumption and decreases in exports. Prices of coarse grains are 
not supported as much as those of wheat and corn (Table 1), and the significant shift out 
of wheat and corn acreage results in a net increase in coarse grain, oilseed and sugar beet 
production. Consumption in the oilseed markets is no longer at world prices; the result is 
reduced demand quantity and lower imports. 
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Table 4. Impacts on European Community from Rebalancing at 120 Percent Level. 
Commodity Production Consumption Net Trade 
(%change) (%change) (metric ton 
change) 
Beef 0.21 0.00 16 
Pork 4.36 0.00 536 
Poultry Meat 2.09 0.00 126 
Wheat -16.28 7.54 -17387 
Corn -17.42 18.62 -9549 
Coarse Grains 8.19 -0.62 4844 
Oilseeds 4.23 -8.65 2559 
Oilmeal -1.59 -5.68 1362 
Sugar 0.92 -0.75 227 
Impacts of EC 120 percent rebalancing on U.S. markets are presented in Table 5. 
Although Table 2 showed that the net producer income impacts are slightly positive in 
aggregate, the production column of Table 5 indicates a redistribution of benefits from all 
other producers to wheat and corn producers. Coarse grain and oilseed production declines 
are offset by wheat and corn increases. The increased U.S. grain exports capture about 21 
percent of the world trade opened by lower EC grain supports. 
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Table 5. Impacts on U.S. Markets from EC Rebalancing at 120 Percent Level. 
Commodity Production Consumption Net Trade 
(%change) (%change) (metric ton 
change) 
Beef -0.04 -0.01 -4 
Pork -1.60 0.63 -163 
Poultry Meat -0.24 0.20 -43 
Wheat 2.57 -1.87 1826 
Com 1.07 -1.29 3854 
Coarse Grains -1.43 1.16 -706 
Oilseeds -2.13 -0.34 -1123 
Oilmeal -0.95 1.50 -567 
Sugar -0.40 0.29 -47 
The redistribution of income among producers is apparent in Table 6. 
Understandably, EC grain farmers incur the largest losses in the rebalancing scheme. 
Oilseed producers are slightly worse off because the 120 percent support is below what they 
receive currently under the processor subsidy scheme. European CAP budget gains more 
than cover producer losses. The savings ($4,374 million) represent almost 18 percent of the 
Community's 1989 agricultural budget. At 120 percent rebalancing, CAP administrators 
could conceivably use the budget savings to directly compensate EC grain and oilseed 
producers, leaving a net welfare gain of $2,524 million to the Community. Although 
livestock feeders must purchase oilseed ingredients at high internal prices, EC consumers 
are left with a huge net welfare gain ($2,510 million). 
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Table 6. Welfare Impacts of EC Rebalancing at 120 Percent Level. 
Commodity Producers Consumers Taxpayers Welfare 
($million) 
European Community 
Beef 28 0 -8 
Pork 408 0 -251 
Poultry Meat 91 0 -57 
Wheat -3956 3544 1311 
Corn -1219 1717 655 
Coarse Grains 78 440 -167 
Oilseeds -241 -1885 2361 
Oilmeal 411 -1307 558 
Sugar 40 0 -28 
Total -4360 2510 4374 2524 
United States 
Beef -19 24 0 
Pork -175 171 0 
Poultry Meat -65 76 0 
Wheat 393 -161 0 
Corn 479 -371 0 
Coarse Grains -41 21 0 
Oilseeds -341 233 0 
Oilmeal -204 221 0 
Sugar -8 5 0 
Total 19 219 0 238 
Rest of World 
Beef -88 86 0 
Pork -797 820 0 
Poultry Meat -113 132 0 
Wheat 3637 -4132 0 
Corn 791 -1017 0 
Coarse Grains -340 264 0 
Oilseeds -860 885 0 
Oilmeal -355 423 0 
Sugar -98 93 0 
Total 1777 -2446 0 -699 
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U.S. producer and consumer redistributions are fairly significant in pork, wheat, com, 
and oilseeds. Overall producer surplus gain is minimal (the object of rebalancing at 120 
percent) but con:Jumers gain considerably. This redistribution illustrates how policies in 
Europe have distorted production and consumption in the U.S. 
The rest of the world (outside the U.S. and EC) is a net importer of agricultural 
commodities. Higher world grain prices dominate the welfare impacts on this group of 
countries and consumer losses exceed producer gains. Net welfare gain to the world as a 
whole of over $2 billion indicate gainers (mainly the EC) could in principle not only 
compensate losers but also have a considerable remaining surplus to provide foreign 
economic development assistance or benefits in other forms. 
Conclusions 
A world trade model determined the uniform internal price level at which the 
European Community could rebalance commodity supports to leave net U.S. producer 
surplus essentially unchanged from the 1989 level. In total producer welfare terms, the U.S. 
could justify support of European rebalancing if EC supports are no more than 120 percent 
of the 1989 world market price. However, net welfare gains to U.S. consumers and the 
nation as a whole would be substantial. 
EC rebalancing would entail considerable producer income redistribution in the U.S. 
If potentially divisive political and economic problems with U.S. producer income 
redistribution could be overcome, significant net gains could accrue to U.S. consumers with 
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EC rebalancing. Reducing EC support levels would respond to another U.S. objective --
reducing EC grain export subsidies. 
The EC is the major beneficiary of rebalancing grain and oilseed price supports 
under the CAP at a uniform level of 120 percent of 1989 world market prices rather than 
the 1989 actual supports averaging 140 percent of world prices. The magnitude of th'e gain 
to the EC is over ten times that of the U.S. The rebalancing results in large EC budget 
savings and considerable consumer surplus gains. Because EC producer income would fall, 
rebalancing might need to be phased in over several years and attended by decoupled direct 
payments and related adjustment assistance to producers. 
Net welfare gains to the EC, the U.S., and the world would be even larger if 
rebalancing results in EC supports less than 120 percent of 1989 average EC supports. 
Clearly, a basis exists for further negotiations and agreement to cap the CAP. 
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